NATO, Australia and the future partnership by Rod Lyon
NATO countries met in Bucharest just over a week ago. Tourists unlucky 
enough to be in the city at the time would not have enjoyed the experience. 
The city was locked down. Businesses were closed and residents had 
been encouraged to leave town for a few days. Roads were partitioned 
by barriers that separated the normal traffic from NATO’s motorcades and 
vehicles. The security presence was intense. 
Australian attention was fixed upon the summit by a rare event: the 
attendance of the Prime Minister and Defence Minister at NATO’s high 
table. The invitations to Australian political leaders were a welcome signal 
that NATO intends to take its partners more seriously. But after the summit, 
it is obvious that both Australia and NATO have to think harder about what 
their ‘partnership’ means. NATO—its 60th anniversary approaching next 
year—seems divided over its own grand strategy, and confused about 
where the partnerships fit in the greater scheme of things.
NATO always was the Western Cold War alliance most highly adapted to its 
environment. With its plethora of committees and interlocking mechanisms 
for military cooperation, it was specifically built to offset Soviet power 
in Europe. Such highly adapted structures usually don’t cope well with 
sudden and dramatic changes in their environment. Adaptation costs are 
high. But since the end of the Cold War, NATO has attempted two major 
strategic initiatives. The first initiative has been a strategy of enlargement, 
offering the warm, inclusive embrace of membership to the struggling 
democracies in Eastern Europe. The second initiative has been a strategy 
of engagement, a willingness to use the alliance’s assets ‘out of area’ as a 
contribution to wider interests in global stability.
Both initiatives are under pressure. Enlargement faltered in Bucharest, 
with only two of five potential candidates granted admission to the alliance. 
And engagement out of area—symbolised by the NATO commitment to 
the mission in Afghanistan—drew only mixed support. Yet again NATO’s 
secretary-general called for the lifting of caveats that limit the operational 
roles of many national contingents, but without substantial effect. 
Australia is an important partner for this evolving NATO. It brings to the 
relationship both competent military forces and a willingness to deploy 
them to distant theatres. Australians have seen their own alliance, ANZUS, 
head down a similar path of out of area engagement, as the alliance moved 
under the Howard Government from being a regional enterprise to more 
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of a global one. That’s how we met up with NATO. Two regional alliances on 
opposite sides of the world ended up in Afghanistan together, and realised 
they had interests in common and might increasingly be pursuing those 
interests in the same geographic space.
In essence, therefore, the concept of partnership has arisen from two 
intersecting strategies of engagement. But when Europeans think about 
partnerships, they frequently lump them together with the first NATO strategy, 
the strategy of enlargement. They tend therefore to think about their partners 
in much the same way they think about aspiring members of their alliance. 
This is an unhelpful conflation. Membership applicants can be assigned 
membership action plans, and encouraged to jump through a series of 
hoops to make them prove their fitness for NATO inclusion. But partners 
aren’t like that: Japan, and Australia and South Korea, for example, must be 
approached as equals.
Moreover, NATO’s Asian partners are not looking for membership. Australia 
already has its own alliance relationship with the United States. So too do 
Japan and South Korea. No serious consideration is given in Canberra 
to the option of transforming all the Cold War Western alliances into one 
mega-alliance, under the NATO name.
Some political leaders in NATO countries speak ambitiously of making the 
alliance the dominant military organisation on the Eurasian continent. Such 
visions are still only a gleam in the eye; it is far from certain as yet what role 
most NATO countries might want to play in Asia. Still, Australia should be 
cautious about any proposal for a significantly bigger NATO role in the Asian 
theatre. The Asian security environment is complex and nuanced. It has 
never been especially accepting of multilateral alliance structures, let alone 
of a Western-dominated, Eurocentric alliance structure that attempted to treat 
Eurasia as one strategic entity. 
It is natural that European countries will take a greater strategic interest in 
Asia as the world’s economic engines come to rely more heavily on Asian 
dynamism. Just as Australia was strategically interested in Europe when 
Europe was central to global stability, European countries are increasingly 
looking abroad in their search for global strategic stability. But here NATO 
countries are torn, because they simultaneously fear that the growing 
importance of the partnership arrangements suggests a waning US interest 
in Europe itself, and a dilution of Europe’s strategic gravitas. It is not only in 
Australia that a debate is occurring about the proper priority to be given to 
expeditionary missions as opposed to more local ones.
All that would suggest that NATO and its partners need to do more work 
on partnership arrangements. In part, they need to talk more about what 
partnerships actually mean. At the practical, operational end of the spectrum, 
‘partnership’ simply means that we should consult more and that we should 
work to become more interoperable when our forces overlap. But at the other 
end of the spectrum lies a veritable can of worms. What is NATO’s grand 
strategy for the 21st century? What role can it play in Asia? Will all the NATO 
countries be involved in expeditionary missions or are we increasingly seeing 
the alliance fracture into a two-tier organisation? What new structures might 
be necessary to augment existing arrangements? Do partners intend to 
‘consume’ NATO security rather than merely complement it? 
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At this high-end level of partnership, we have to keep our own interests 
firmly in mind. Australia wants a stable Asia, and not merely an Asia where 
everyone hedges against potential threats. It hopes to get that stable Asia 
by growing opportunities for the Asian great powers to work more together 
in the field of security cooperation. It is wrong to think that the Asian security 
order can be determined by outsiders. We are past that time. Asian countries 
must find it within themselves to build a stable regional security system, 
where responsibility for public goods doesn’t rest solely with Washington. 
In short, NATO’s partnerships in Asia have to support, not slow, a transition 
to a regional security order where the Asian great powers carry more of 
the weight. 
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